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The SpraUy Islands located at the heart of South China Sea is developing to 
be a fl as hpoint in the region. Geological surveys conducted underneath the seabeu 
of these islands following the oil crisis in the 1970s shows an enormous potential 
of oil and gas reserves notwithstanding the existencc of rich marine resources . 
Moreover, with the adoption of thc new international Law of the Sea concept there 
are overlapping claims by contending count ries. Unless these claimant countries 
namely, China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines, reconcile 
their differences and come to terms the conflict is bound to escalate . 
This thes is is an in depth study of the disputes over the Spratlys and examines 
four cases of isl ands based territorial disputes that could be used as a model in 
resolvi ng these tensions. Although there is an apparent build up of mili tary 
capabilit ies by claimant countries in recent years, this thesis argues that a military 
option will only create division and strain longstanding an.imosities. Instead, a 
peaceful solution is recommend~d through a cooperative regime as quickly as 
possible so that they will realize the full potentials of these islands 
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I. INTRODUCT ION 
For several years the issue of who owns the Sprat J ys, o r 
some part thereof, has been a:1d 8t i 1 1 is a lir:gering prob l em 
in Asia. Today six Asian cou:ltries namely China (Peoples 
Republic o f China), the Philippines, Vietnam (Socialist 
Repub l ic of Vietnam), Taiwan (Kepublic ot China), Malaysia and 
Brunei have steadfast l y la,id clair:ls to so:ne of the Islands 
compr.ising the Spratlys either by "irtue of longstanding 
hist.orica l a:1tecedents, by meTe physical occupa t ion, or as 
par t of the i r growing terri torial boundaries invoking the new 
i:1terna t ional Law of the Sea concept that e stablishes a 200 
mile Exclusive Economic ZO:le (EEZ) . As a result, there are 
overlappi ng claims aIld to some degree these claims caused 
sporadic mi l itary confro!1tations among the claimar:t countri e s , 
Lhereby creat i ng tens io:1 in this region . 
The situ<ltion was exacerbated in Febru<l ry 1.992 whe:1 Ch i r:a 
prom:llgated and enforced :::he Territorial Wa ters Act, wh i ch 
declares that the Spratly and Paracel I sla:1ds, located in the 
South China Sea form an i ntegral part of hcr terri:::ory . Th i s 
<lct passed by :::he Star.dir.g CommiL:::ee of the Nat i.onal PeQplcs 
Cor:gress of Chtna not only affirmed t er::-itoria l sovf!rcignty , 
bU::: explicit l y reserved the r1ght t o use mi l itary torce 1:1 the 
area. 1 The rest of the contending countries sharply protested 
this pronouncement . As far as the threat environment in the 
South China Sea is concerned, it is bound to grow more complex 
and volatile. It seems that there is no unanimity among the 
countries bordering on the South China Sea as to the ownership 
of these islands. The Spratly I slands thus remains a powder 
keg with the potentia l for igniting large-scale open military 
confronta tion . 
A. The Response of As i an Countries 
A number of Asian states have responded to the Spratly 
situation . Malaysia for one has placed her military troops on 
alert. At the same time, it was very cautious in response to 
Beij ing. Foreign Minister Datuk Abdullah Badawi stated ::hat 
"lVI.alaysia wanted to avoid a military confrontation in the 
South China Sea at all cost and would joint l y develop only 
with Vietnam the Islands over which the two have joint claims. 
Our decision is not intended to involve others or other areas 
where there are multiple players".2 The Philippines, on the 
other haed, indicated tha t it will remain "vigilant" but 
wanted to "see to it that the Spratlys do not become a 
1 "Chiea Tes t ing The Waters", Far Eastern Bcar.ornic 
Review March 1.2 , 1992 , p. 9 . 





















rd l itary f l ashpo i nt".3 Taipei protested that these initia-
ti.ves wou l d threate:1 both the traditiona l !'ishing ri9"nts in 
the Soueh China Sea aod the Taiwan Strait_s, as we l l as the 
established free [-aesage rights through r e gional choke points. 
Viet:13n [or :'1er part sent secret protest nOL.es to Peking at 
both the party and staLe l e v e l s in an attempt not LO escalate 
the dispute. Brune i quietly pushed for the adoption of the New 
Tntf!rnational Law of the Sea concept. 
These irritant s and confrontations have been minimized 
l arge l y due to dip l omatic initiatives a:1c. a growing security 
concern among other Asian countries, but how long will chesc 
issues remain unresol ved without: undermi n ing the stabi l i t.y of 
the region? Whil e these conf l icts did not escal ate in the last 
decade or so , now t:J.at: t:he cold war is over a nd the large 
United S t.ates mi l it.ary contingent. which served as a stabiliz-
i ng force in Asia, ;'lave been finalLy withdrawn from the 
Philippines, t.heir departure may spark a scramb l e [or the 
Sprat l ys . The pullout of American mi l itary troops may creat:c 
a power vacuum and t.he massive military bui l d up, and regu l ar 
maneuvers on l and and in the South China Sea teing undert.aken 
by China is an indication t:hat it bas moved in to fill this 
3 A. James Gregor , The Sorat l ys and t he Security Env i ron-
men'- jn the SO·l t- h "h i na Seas The National Defense University 
Pres s , Washington , D . C., p. 219 . 
Admiral Charles Larson of the Uni ted States Navy arg"J€S 
that many of the positive developme!1cs tna':: occur in As ia 
today and elsewhere were bor:1 of many fac tors but founded in 
the military power of the Uo i ted States. A stabilizing 
American presence in Asia is :::leeded, given the historic 
animosities and social and ecoucmic pressures that provide the 
pote:1tial for catastrophe. The U.S. presence and power act as 
a brake on ins tability and serve to promote cooperation in 
that region. 4 
B. Resource Potentials 
Although historical records revealed r:luch earlier the 
existence of disputes over these is lands groups, i t was only 
during the post-World War II era that it b ecame more pro-
:lOUIlced. S Japan occupied the Islands in 1939 as a forward 
staging base in the pursuit of its Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere policy. However. her occupation ended 
abruptly when Japan surrendered i n 1945 . Speci fically in 
Article 2 of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty between the 
Allied Powers and Japan provides that: Japan renoUr!ces all 
rights, titles and claims to the Spratlys a:1d to the Paracel 
4 Ralp A. Cossa, The New Pacific Security Environment· 
~.QSL~illL.QQp.9.cr.!J.~ The National Defense University 
Press, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 14. 
S Ji Gouxing, The Sprat 1ys Disputes and Prospect for 
~, Insti tute of Strategic and International Studies, 

























Is l ands, but th8 treaty :jid not state to whom the Islands 
be l onged." This v i rtually opened a " Pandor:-a's Box" encourag-
ing occupation of the i Slands by any interested country. 
:.1oreover, t he Spratlys' economic pot en t ial, p<lrt i cula:!:"ly 
the prospects for the development of offshore oil and othe r 
marine reso"J.r.ces, have :!:"eawakened the interest of these 
co;mtries in pursuing their respective te:!:"riLo!:"ial claims. 
I t was r.epo!:.""ted i.n t :'1e late 1. 950s and the earl y 1960s , 
that a n"J.mber of seismic studies and geological surveys 
suggest that the Fast China and the Sout :'1 Chir::a Seas are 
potentially rich in recoverabl e oil deposits. Since 1. 982, mo!:"e 
than t hree hundr.ed p!:.""omising geologic structures en the 
continental shelf of the South Chir:a Sea have bee!":! identified. 
Th8 es t imates of recove:!:"ablc oil in this part of the region 
range from a modest 1 1 billion barre l s of reserves to almost 
160 billLm bar:!:"e l s. 7 This belief was r e inforced when eil 
explorers hit "black go l d" off the coast of North Borneo, in 
Malaysia, offshore Pala wan in the Philippines, and in the Bach 
Ho oil fields eff the coast of Vietnam. That. the islands ar.e 
ric:'1 in resource potent ia l s such as oil, natural gas, as well 
as abundant marine life, raises the possibili ty of inter.na -
tional violence in pursuit of politica:' conlro:'. 
6 I\ l an J. Day, Border and 'T'errito,...jal Discutes Ga l e 
Resea!:"ch Company, Detroit, Michigan, 1982, p . 330. 
7 A . James G:!:"egor, Op cit. p. 225. 
c . I?r osp ects f o r cooperati on 
Indonesia, which is not a party to this conflict, called 
China's territorial claim "unfortunate"S and offered to 
broker an honest solution by hosting two semi-official 
seF.linars in 1990 - 1991 in an effort to achieve a peaceful 
settlerr,ent of the territorial conflict. This was fo l lowed by 
another workshop in July 1992 to seek cooperation among the 
claimant countries through the conduct of joint maritime 
exploration and research studies in the disputed territories. 
Apparently, no country is yet ready for formal talks . 9 
Perhaps, with the absence of bipolar rivalry that character -
ized the end of the cold war, regional, bilateral or F.laybe a 
multilateral organization could be explored as an avenue for 
resolving this con f lict. 
These initiatives bring hopes for peace in the region. I 
will consider them, and the lessons learned from other 
resolved cases of Island territorial disputes such as what 
happened in the Falklands, Timor, Spi tzbergen (Svalbard), 10 
and Antarctica in formulating a strategy that wil l help reduce 
s Far Eas t ern Ec onomic Review, March 12, 1992, Op cit . p. 
, . 
9 Clayton Jones, "Paradise Islands or an Asian Powder 
Keg?" , "I:he Christian Sdence Moni~or, Dec.1 , 1992 , P. 19 . 
10 Spitzbergen (Svalbard), is an archipelago consisting 
of s everal large and many smal l islands located 100 nautical 
miles North of the Norwegian mainland. These islands are 
occupi~d )ointly by )Jorwegians and Russians who a r e engaged in 




th i s brewing tension in the Spratlys, thus helping promote 
peace and security in the region. Of course there are military 
initia.tives undertaken by contending countries, hence the 
















greatly Clffect the ,esolution of the conflict . 
The lessons learned from these CClses could provide 
insights i nto an a lternative mcdel L-hat could so:nehow l essen 
t he impact of this growing i s 1 and terri torial dispute. The 
Fa J k 1 and Islands, for exarr.ple, could be viewed as a case where 
contending parties were r::ot able to resolve the conf l ict 
peacefully resul ting in wa!:' between Great Britain and Argenti -
r:a . On the oL'1er hand the Timor case presents a s t ark contz:ast 
ir: that, despite the absence of a regionaJ council oz: organi -
zat':an, Indonesia and AuS'~ralia agreed on a z one of coopera-
t i or:: i n the Timor Sea. 11 
Other r'lodels that would be :lsed to help resolve the 
conf l ict peacefully is the one adopted in the An t arctic and 
the Spitzbergen . A key feature o[ L'1e Antarctic Treaty is an 
agreement among the twelve contesting nations t o froze their 
territorial claims until the pact was subjected for revi e w in 
1991 and also prohibits the use of these lands for the 
establishmer:t of miJitary bases cr fort i ficatio:ls as well as 
tl".e testing of any type of military weapor:s or the use of 
l~ C:wan W. Anderson , An l\tlas o[ Worl d Pel i t i c"l 
Fl ashpoinLs, Tex t, 3wan w. Anderson; l"I.aps, Printer Publishers, 
1993 , p . 193. 
these lands for nuclear explosions . In t~e case of the 
Spitzbergen Treaty, the United States played a major role in 
bringing together the historical, economic, geographical and 
scientific differences of Norway and Russia ever the islands. 
Instead the coal resources of the islands were developed 
jointly by ~orway and Russia while the United States and otr.er 









I I. BASES OF CONTENTION 
The contending countr i es <l-r;-e compe1 1ed by various i nter -
ests in estab l ish i ng their cla i ms over any part of the SpraL l y 
Is l ands , r.anging : rom purely econo:nic reasons, or enhdncing 
their !:"<:'spective national security interests, to e xpanding 
the i r maritiIT.e space. 
The Sprat l y Is1 ands arc situated in t he Sout h China Sea 
and compr. i se app:::-cxi:nately 100 islets and coral r ee:s. This 
grcup of ~ s .1 ands is locat_ed seuth of 12 degrees no:::-th and east 
of 111 degrees east , but e xc l ude s those i slands withir: 40 
naut i cal :ni les of the coast of Brllcei ar:d !>'.alays i a, and tr.ose 
within the treaty l i mi ts of the Phi l ippine s. Thes e i slands are 
in a deep ocean basin, rhombo i d i n shape, located approxi:na.te -
ly 300 :l.autica l miles west of the is l ar.d of Palawan i n t he 
?hi l ippines, 300 nautical mil es East of Vietnam and 650 
nautical ro i ler> South of Eaina:l., China. l 2 Western navjgators 
have divided the area into R8ed Bank, th8 Sprat l y Islands and 
the Da:1gerOl:s Ground, but the whol p. arp.a i s usual l y referre d 
to as the Spra t ly Is l ands . 
St.rate gicdlly t he islands commc:md a choke po i r:t at the 
very heart o f t he Sou th China Sea which is a mdjor sea line of 
communication (S1,Qe) in the region. Ships from Vladivostok, 
Pusan, Yok ohama , Shimonosp.ki, Tsing Tao, Hong Kor:g and 
Ibid, p . 19 J . 
Singapore pass across the South China Sea. Moreover, the 
industrialized nations of Northeast: Asia that rely heavily on 
trade and cor:unerce. depend largely on this vi tal sea lane. The 
1 987 census indicates that around 45 percent of the total 
amount of imports to Japan passes from the Persian Gulf 
through the Strait of Ma!acca thence to the South China Sea. 
Obviously a ny obstruction of the e xisting free passage through 
these sea lanes would have a severe impact upon Japan's 
industrial capacity and economy. The other countries in Asia, 
as well, would be adverse ly affected in the event that China 
attempted to impose restrictions or- controls over this major 
sea line of corrununication. The South China Sea I s lands are 
considered "very important geographically as a key link" on 
the shipping lanes that arc from the Middle East to Northeast 
China .13 Any tension that may be sparked in the South China 
Sea could seriously affect the economic progress of the 
nations that are dependent on this vital sea line of conununi-
cation. 
For purposes of classification the Spratlys comprise 
twelve regions wi th islands, reefs and cays as fO l lows;14 
1. North Danger Islands; 
Northeast Cay, about 1 km long and 400 meters wide , is 
covered with coarse grass and low bushes as well as 
thickly wooded tress growing about 6 to 9 meters. 
13 A. James Gregor, Op cit. p. 226. 
14 Dieter Heinzig, Disputed I slands in the South China 





















about .5 kID leng dnd 
is similar t:o Nortr,east 
2. Thltu Is l ands and Reefs. 
Thitu I slands, about 1 5 km long and 1 k..'l', wi de, 
covere d with grdCls, scn.:.b, and ;Jalm tree:'!. 
Sand Cay, a tiny is l et without vegeLat i on . 
wide. 
3. West York I s l ands, about 500 me::ers long and 320 meters 
wide, covered wi:::h trees. 
4. Loaita Is l and ar:d Reefs. 
Loaita is l and, an covered with mangrove bushes, 
:-:o c onut palms and 
Larnkiarll Cay, a t i ny sand cay. 
Laaiea Cay . 
'). Irving Cay. 
6. Nanshan I sland, about 'ORO meters long and 2.5 meters 
high, covcl:"ed with coarse grass. 
F l de Is l and, ·.."hite dune about 240 me ters long and 90 
meters wi de and 2 neters high. 
7. Tizard Bank and Reefs. 
ltu Aba Is l ar.d, about:. km long acd 400 meters wide, 
covered with tress and scrub. 
island, about 1 9 meters high, covered with 
and sr:1al l tress. 
Sand Cay, covered with bushes. 
8 . UniOl: Bi;l.nK and Reefs 
Sin Cowe Island, about 7. . 5 meters high. 
sin Cowe Cay. 
9. Spratly Ic;land , about 750 meters long and 1100 meters 
wide, covered with vege t aL ion. 
1 0. Cormnodore Reef, about .3 meters high. 
11. Mariv eles Reef, about 1.5 meters high. 
12. Aroboyana Cay, about 2 meters high, consisting of neach 
of sand and broken coral , partly covered wi th a bed of 
guano. 
A. China Asserts Inviolable Sovereignty 
China anchors its claim over the spratlys on the basis of 
his t orical records. The PRe maintains that as far back as the 
Han Dynasty (206 B.C. to 220 A.D,l, the whole South China Sea 
was part of China's territory being a part of "Chinese 
Lake" (Fig 1.) and all the islands islets, shoals, cays, banks, 
and cora l reefs within this area are part of Chinese territo-
ry . 15 
China contends that the historical evidence contains proof 
that the Chinese were the very first to discover , exploit, and 
develop the Spratly Islands . Nevertheless, it was not known 
how or when the South China Sea and its islands were initially 
registered as part of the Chinese world. The expression "South 
China Sea" probably did not enter the Chinese lex icon any 
earlier than the Han dynasty with the absorp t ion of sou t hern 
15 Chiu, Hung , "South China Sea I slands: Implications for 
Delimitating the Seabed and Future Shipping", China Quarterly, 
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FI GURE 1; China Lake , (Re f .Sout. h China Sea, Treacherous Shoals , 
FEER, 8/13/n p . )5) 
13 
China. 16 During that era, Ma Yuan led a fleet of approximate-
ly 2,000 vessels to carry out the conquest of Jih · nan or Nort h 
Vietnam, which undoubtedly led to expanded contact with t he 
islands of the Sout h elina Sea. As a result of this successful 
military venture, t:'1e Sou'.::h China Sea became an area of 
interest to Chinese historians and geographers , but they made 
no specific references to its islands and atolls for several 
centuries. 17 
Notwithstanding these early references to the Spratly 
Islands, the Chinese apparent l y did not formally assert 
sovereignty over the islands until the lat e nineteenth 
century. The matter of Chinese sovereignty over the South 
China Sea islands first arose as an issue in the last quarter 
o f the 1 9th century purely as a reaction to the increasing 
domination of the region by France, England and Japan . 
Moreover, in Augus t 1951, invoking national security 
poli cy and nationa l interest, Zhou Enlai who was then the 
Foreign Minister of the PRC, asserted the "inviolable sover-
eignty" of the People's Republic of China over the Spra'.::ly 
Islands and the Paracel archipelago. 18 Since then China has 
aggressively pursued her interests and to date occupied eight 
16 ,Ton M. Dyke & DaJ e L. Bennet t, Is l ands and ~he Del im j -
tahqo of Oc§P Space in thf> South China Sea, The university 
of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 62. 
17 Jon M. Van Dyke and Dale L . Bennett, Op c it. p. 62. 




















(8) i slets, reef a'ld other un:1arned cays with in thc Spratly 
Island Group. These is l ands include; Subi. Reef, Fiery Cross 
Reef, J ohnson Reef, Cuateron Reef, Gaven Reef, C:'u Tap and 
Chan Vien. 
From an economic standpoi:1t, China, j ust like the res:; of 
:;r.e clai:nant countries , foresees Lhe potentia l o f the recover· 
ah l e oil that wi l l help boust its indus~.!."ia l developmenL i:l 
the next century. Only recently the China Nat .i onal Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signed a joint e xp l oration contract 
with Crestone E:lergy Corporation (Crestone), an Amer i can oil 
company, three m~mths af ter the promulgation of the China 
Territorial Waters ACL to pursue expl orati:::l:l i 1: a block: 
contiguous to an offshore oil field of Vietnam . The contract 
stipulates that Crestone will shoulde r the cost of t:!1ree years 
at exp l oration hut it will sr.are the ::::ecovery expenses witI'. 
CNQQC if no oi l is found . 19 O:Iowever, this move is :::lpposed 
strongl y by Vi e tnam, saying that the exploration 
infringement on Vie tnam's sovereignty. 
Moreover, in a:l effort :;0 assert her claim over t :1.e 
Sp::::atly Islands, China in January 1992 conunissio:led a large 
and impressive body of officials to make a circuit o f the 
Spra t ly archipelago . One rl"clndred and thirty - two State offi -
cials from the i'eople's Lih e ration Army's Kavy , the State 
Oceanic Corrmission :::If :Iainan provi'lce, together with represe:l-
19 "':'erritoria l Disputes Simmers ir. Areas of South China 
Seas" , Oi l & GillL.J.9~, ,July 13, 1992, p . 20. 
tatives from the Chinese Communist Party, posted claim plaque s 
I 
I 
on so!r.e of the major islets, atolls, and sand banks of the I 
Spratly chain of islands. 20 
B. Taiwan Holds Onto China Lak e 
The basis of Taiwan's claim over the disputed Spratly 
Island Group i s the contention that Taiwan is the only 
legitimate goverrJltent that represents the Chinese people . 
Hence , Taiwan holds on::o the same historical data invoked by 
PRC, that the South China Sea is a "China Lake ", and the 
territory i ncluding the Spratly Island Group is part of her 
territory . 
One additional claim by Ta iwan is grounded on the right of 
occupation by operation of international l a w based on the 
events of the early post - Worl d War II days. The Chinese 
Nat ional is:: government sent troops to occupy the Spratlys and 
also the Parace l s Islands , some fifteen months after the 
surrender of Japan . However, these naval forces were withdrawn 
in 1950 in conjunction with the wi::hdrawal of the Xationalists 
!:rom mainland China to Taiwan . Taiwan now asserts that it has 
sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands in accordance 
wi t h the rights of occupation as provided by interna::ional 
law . Hence, in 1962 Taiwan occupied Itu Aba I sland permanent· 
ly. :;.iowever . Taiwan's occupation of Itu Aba wa s cDIlsidered by 






the Phi l ippines as infringement upon their territorial rights 
when Fi l ipino settlers occupying the i s l and at that time were 
forcibly ejected. Since that time Taiwan fo!.'tif i ed I tu Aba, 
i mproving on tl1e buildi ngs lcf t by the Japanese and those con-
structed by the e j ected Fi l ip ino se t tlers 
C. Vietnam Increases Its Stakes 
I Vietnam ' s claim to the Sprat l ys Is l ands dates :rom the 
I 
I 
late eighteenth century . The Vietnamese refer to t he islands 
as the "Truong Sa" Archipe l ago. T11e Vietnamese gove!:.""nment 
claims that beth the .3pratlys and the Pa!:.""acels belong to them 
after it was ceded by the French Govern.:nent, right after she 











re:uted the claim of Vi etnam over L"1e Sprat l ys but acknowledg -
es the transfer of the Parace l s to Vietnam. Despite the French 
position , Vietnam cccupied one of the seven I s l ets on 22 
Augus t 1956, and eventually occupied twenty fou r (2 4) islands, 
islets, reefs, cays,anc.! some unnamed Shoa l s. 
S::'nce the adopt ion of the 1982 UN Convention on Lhe Law of 
the Sea, Vietnam has stepped 1..:p its occupatioYl of the Spra::lys 
to get the best gains . It took measures to iYlcrease its 
military s t rength on the is l ands and enlisted foreign oil 
companies to engage in the exploration and exploitation of the 
Spratly seabed . On November 2':;, 1982, Vie t nam specifically 
Shim Jae Hoon, "Blood thicker Than Politics ", .f.a.l;: 
~~r.n Economic Rev j ew , May 5, 1988, p . 26. 
declared that its territorial waters included the Spratlys and 
~he Paracels. 22 Thus the occupation of the rest of the 2'; 
islands continued until 1989. The islands presently occupied 
h y Vietnam in the Spratlys include the following: Southwest 
Cay (Nanzi Dao) , Sand Cay (Dungian Shazhou), Namyit (Hongxiu 
Dao) , Sin Cowe (Jinghon DaD), Spratly Island (Nanwei Dao) , 
Amboyana Cay (Ar.bo Shazhou), Pearson Reef ( L iumen Jio) , Eldad 
Reef (Zhong Jiao) , Owen Shoal (Aoyuan AnshaJ, Rifleman Tank 
(Nanwei Tan), Barque Canada Reef (8ai Jiao) , North Danger Reef 
(Shuanzi Qunjiao), Bombay Castle (?engbobao), Prince of Wa les 
Bank (Guanga Tan), Vanguard Bank (Wanan Tan), Discovery Great 
Reef (:>axian Jiao) , Wumie Jiao, Cornwalis South Reef (Nanhua 
Jiao) , Petley Reef (Bolan Jiao) , and Nailuo Jiao.2J 
However t:he occupation of these islands is opposed 
strongly by the Peoples Republic of China. Moreover, Chir.a has 
stepped up its military presence not only in the Spratly 
Islands but around the South China Sea to bolster its claim 
and to contain Hanoi's "inherent expansionist designs" in the 
Spratly Islands. 24 
22 Ji Gouxing, Op ci t p. 9. 
2] Ibid, pp. 9 - 10. 
24 Jerry Cushing. "Beached Again On Shoals", ~a~ 





















D. Malaysia Establishes A Resort 
Malaysia' s ent:~y into t:'1C disputed area was accompJ ished 
through the occupation of four(4) islets aed reefs one of 
wh ich is V.arive l es Reef which is also being coot-ester: by the 
Phil ippines. 
In 1 979 V.alaysia uni l aterally extended its boundary line 
from the poin t at 1 09 degrees 38 minutes east and 6 degrees 1 8 
minutes nort h, in a l ine that ::raverses in ar: east-:1or theas t 
direction. The motivation of the Malaysiar. governme:1t [or this 
action was undoubtedly the growing scramble [ 8r offshore oil 
in the South China Sea and the new 200-mi l e Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) concept . 
Earli er, Malaysia occupied Commodore Reef, w:1.ich is a 1.80 
c la imed hy the Philippines . 3ut after a sLrong protese hy the 
Philippines, )ojal aysia finally vacated the Reef. 
The three isle',--s occup':ed by l>'.a.lays ia are Dallas, Shal l ow 
and Louisa Reefs , But the occupation of Louisa Ree f i s beil~g 
contested by both Brunei and the Ph i 1 i ppines. The ?hilippines 
contends that these is l ets a!'e within "Barangay Kalayaan" a 
village of the town of Pa l awan. On t he o'~her hand, Brunei 
claims that Louisa Reef is we l l insi.de its te!'ritorial limi ts. 
Recent deve l opme:lts occurred on May 199 ::' whet: Malaysia 
ar.nounced t he developF.lent of "Terumba Layang Atoll" (Swallow 
19 
Reef) as a tourist resort. This initiative was vehemently 
opposed by both Vietnam and China. 25 
E. Brunei Joins Tbe Group 
The latest claimant to join the disputed territory of the 
Spratly Is l and Group is Brunei. Al though nothing was mentioned 
yet about whether Brunei has occupied any islands, her entry 
into the dispute was purely motivated by adopting the new 
international Law of the Sea cO:lcept just l ike the rest of the 
ocher claimants. 26 Invokir.g this new concept, Brunei unilat-
erally dec l ared a 200-mile EEZ that obvious l y overl apped t:he 
EEZ of Malays-=-a and the Philippines. Economical l y, the area 
being claimed hy Brunei has a rich potential for oil exp l ora -
tion and other marine resource hence there is a possibility of 
border disputes between Malaysia and the Philippines. 
F. Philippines Lays Claims On Kalayaan 
The Philippines' claim to eight islands in the Spratlys is 
anchored on legal grounds that were invoked as soon as the 
Japanese and the Taiwanese started aba!1doning the islands in 
1950. Believi!19 that the Islands have reverted to open 
occupancy, or res nullius a group of intrepid Filipinos headed 
by Tomas Cloma sailed to w~at is now called Freedom Land or 
2S Ewan W. Ar.derscn, Op cit. p. 195. 
26 Mark Valencia, "All· For- Everyone Solution", Far Eas t ern 





















"!!:alayaan " 1:1 Filipino. Thereafter Clema lodge EOrIl'.al claims 
to j ustify ownership t o t hese is l ands by several proclamations 
which includes a Notice to Lhe lihcle World in May 15 , 1956; an 
I ns truIncnt of Notification, a Charter of the Free Terri tory of 
Freedoml and and Proc l arnat .i on, all s i gned in July 6, 1956. 
Howeve r in December r., 1974, Cl oma executed a Deed of Ass i gn-
ment and wa i ver of RightB transferring his claims 0: Kalayaan 
in favo r of the Philippines government. 
Aside trom physical occupation and placing these is l ands 
under the pc l iLical j ur isdiction ot the town of E'alawan, Lhe 
Philipp i n es issued Presidential Decrees 1596 and 1599 t o 
sUbRtantiate its cla im over these islands in the Sprat l ys . 8r: 
Ju ne 11, 1978 , President Ferdinand E. ~.I[arcos signed Presiden -
tial Decree (1596) , whic h claimed ':-he Ka l ayaan group Eor the 
Philippines. These islands , he declared , were "u noccupied, 
unoweed and u nposseSRed islands, which had nOl even been shown 
on F.laps betore the Second World War, and the Philippines had 
t hereEore occupied them aR res nullius27 or no one's territo -
ry" . The area claimed now extends over an area of 70, 1 50 
square aautical miles, covered by another Presidential Decree 
(1599), issued Jul y 17 , 1978 , procla irr.ing ':-he Kalayaan group 
of islandR to be wilhin the EEZ of the Philippines. 
Based on these grol.:nds , the Philippines are occupying 
seven islands namely Thitu (Fagasai, Nanshan ::s land (Lawak), 
2"1 Alan J. Day, Op cit. p . 331.. 
Loaita (Kotal, West York Island (Likas), Flat Island (Patag) , 
Loaita Cay (Panata) and North Dange~ Reef (Paroia l . The 
Phi lippines is contesting two othe~ islands presently occupied 
by Vietnam na!'llely Namyit (Sinago), and Spratly (Lagos) and 
another island occupied by Ta iwan which is ltu Aba. 
Thitu is the second biggest island in terms of land area. 
Five of these islands torm a cluster occupying a radius of 50, 
miles, while Spratly is located 205 nautical miles southwest 
of the clustered group. 
In terms ot distance Nansha Island or Lawak is the 
nearest island occupied by the Philippines. It has an approxi -
mate distance of :..48 nautical miles from Palawan a t o wn ot the 
Philippines. 
From the Philippine security perspective, tne Spratly 
Islands group is of vital interest, as these islands can serve 
as an advance military outpost or forward operating base in 
detecting any hostile aggressor that comes from tne South 
China Sea. 28 The control of these islands by any of the 
contending parties, particularly China or Vietnam, wou ld 
undermine the security ot the Philippines even more if nuclear 
submarines or nuclear vesOlels were to b e stationed in these 
islands . 























1\t the core of these cla i ms are the incentives for more 
terr :: torial space. The ir.itial rati fication of the :'lew 
I :'lternational Law of the Sea cO:'lcept in 1982 has f urther 
complicated the contention of cla i mant countries . This new 
i nternational law concept encoaraged developing countri es to 
cbart tile :: r new 200 nautical miles EEZ that sometimes over-
lapped the boundari~s of other countries. In essence this new 
I nternat_ional Law of the Sea i s a global (United Nations) 
effort that causes regional problems . 
Another important ::ncentive is the prospects for oi l and 
natural gas that lay underneath this ocean floor . To the 
contesting cO"J.TIt:ries, the expanded jurisdiction ofters them 
the promi se ot a greatly expanded resource base wi th regards 
to minerals, hydrocarbons, and living resources. The United 
Nat i ons Convention on the Law of the Sea (LeS Convention) 
adopt_ed in April 1992 after nine years of negot.i atio:'lS 
recogniz~s the exclusive rights and jurisdiction of the 
coast:al stat:es over the resources to the coast and e xtending 
out to 200 nautical miles (articles 56 & 57). Likewise , the 
convent. ion recognizes the right of the coastal state in the 
resources of i ts continental shelf which may extend up to 350 
miles or heyond under certain circumstances (Articles 76 & 
77). The immense resource potent.ial, both living and 
living , if properly explored, e xploited, cO~lserved, and 
deve l oped , cou l d c0rta i n l y a l leviate of the economic 
23 
problems as well as the growing energy needs affecting some of 
the contending countries and perhaps raise the living stan -
dards of their people . 
I n l arge measure , the principa l interest o~ the contending 
parties in the Spratlys has been in security and strategic 
matters . Recent developments indicate that most claiman t 
countries are gearing up t:a enhance their defenses for the i r 
respective clai ms . Some:'lOw a resolution of this case sho:Jld be 
p u rsu ed to aver~ a,1Y war. The Timor Gap case can serve as a 
model wher-e Australia and Indonesia , tl"xough mut ual agreemen t , 
j oin tly developed marine resou rces, thereby turning their 








































III . THE IMPACT OF MAJOR INCIDENTS ON REGIONAL SECURITY 
The li ttoral st<ltes of the South China. Sea began geo109i -
cal surveys in the 19509 and disccvered p e troleum and g as in 
offshure areas . The reports indicate that p~ospects for oi l 
extraction were good based on the Spratlys ' seabed geologica l 
structures. These su rveys se:::-ved as a fuse for cOl:f l i cting 
claims over the Spratly I slands. After the oil crisis in 19 73, 
the ASEAN coun:::ries began to p l ace a ttention en oi l d evelop -
ment , e xacerbating the on going dispu::es. All the nations 
bordering on Lhis semi -enclosed sea wan t to share in ~ts 
hydrocarbon resource pot entiaL, and appear to think that 
control of some or a l l o f t he i s olated ou t croppings scattered 
through t he sea is a key element to their claim to Lhese 
resources. During t:'le la st few y ears , the tension in the South 
China Sea :'las increased a nd t he legal, po l itical, and miliLary 
pOSitions cf each c l aimant country has hardened. I n the 
process lives and property were l ost , and of Len times these 
conflicts r.ave soured diplomatic re l at:'ons and further 
st rained longs tand ing animosities . 29 
One factor which has an impo r tant bearing on t he incidence 
o[ Lerri tor ial disputes betwe e n Asian countries is the a bsence 
of an all embracing orga:'liz3c ion Lhroug h whir:l": such dispu tes 
might be resolved in a dip lomat ic manner. Al though t he sub-
29 Oil & Gas Journal, July 1 3, 1992, Cp cit . p. 20 . 
25 
regional Association of South East Asian Nations (composed at' 
Indonesia, Malaysia, t he Philippines, Singapore and Thailand ) 
has played a limited role in this respect, South East Asia 
does not have its own equivalent organization like the 
Organization of African unity or the Organization of American 
States, with their channels ot peaceful settlements of 
disputes between member states. ASEAN was formed in 1967 to 
promote regional cooperation in economic , political and 
cultural affairs (Annex A). Until now the group has given a 
low profile to security issues, fearing that doing otherwise 
would lead to accusations by CO!Tl!Tlunist countries that ASEAN 
was fOrl'!ling a collective military alliance. 30 The united 
Nations Organi zation itself has, on occasion, successfully 
filled this void, but in other instances disputes have been 
aggravated by the lack of any regional forum to which inter-
ested parties can refer their claims _ However the successful 
settlement of the Cambodian conflic t at an international 
conference in Paris in October 1991 has finally "opened the 
way to a new phase in ASEAN relations with Indo - Chinese 
countries" .31 
30 Bob Drogin, "Surprise Accord at ASEAN Meeting could 
Settle Spat Over Spratly Islands", Los Angeles Times, July 25, 
1992 . p. A3. 
31 Michael Richardson, "ABEAN Opts For Closer Security 















A . Scramble For The Spratlys 
~any r easons l i e b ehind the scra,nble fo r is l ands in the 
Spratlys bu t the most important i s the possibility of oil or 
gas-bear ing g eol ogica l structu res in the South China Sea. As 
can be s een in the chart (::<'ig.2) fi v e cQunLries are vyi o 'O! fo r 
tree dis puted islands , whil e some tied up wit h foreiqn compa-
nies to develop the oil polential in their res pective territo-
rial j urisdiction immediately after- the oil crunc h in 19 7 3 . 
Some analysts s uggest t hat wi th the popu] ation explosion in 
China , she may become a net oil ill'.porte r b y t!1e t u rn of the 
centl:ry and that its i oLer-est i :1 the South China Sea may be 
fue l led by the continuing problem with exp l oiting the oil - rich 
Tari:n Basin in tr.e Xinjiang regio!"!. ]2 David Fridley, an 
expert 0:1 the Chinese oil =-ndustry at the East - Wes t Cent er in 
Hawaii further claims that "Ch=-na faces a sharply deteriorat· 
ing oi l supply si t uation. Oil accounted for 2.7% ot exports in 
1985 , in value t erms, bu t only 5% in 1991 ".13 Some other 
c laiman t counLries have even more reason Lo be con cerned about 
this oi. l facto r . The Philippines has been about 95% dependent 
on ir'1ported oil, but even the new discovery o t oi l off Palawan 




,2 "South China Sea, Tre acherous Shoals", "'ar Eastern 
Econom i c Review, Ac:g. 13 , 1992. , p. 1 6 . 
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Vietnam was totally dependent on Soviet-supplied oi l ur.til it 
began to pump oil frol'l its offshore field in 1991 . 
B . Maj or I ncidents 
Among the most importa:1t anr.ed incidents that occurred in 
the spratly Islands ~appened in Ju l y 1971 when a Philippine 
fishing ':J oat was fired upon by Taiwanese troops garrisoned on 
ltu Aba . Then President Marcos of the Phi lippines protested 
and maintained that aEte:::- J apan renounced its sovereignty over 
the is l ands they had become a de facto trusteeship of the 
al l ied powers , and that this trusteeship precluded setting up 
garrisons on any of them without the al l ies' consent. 34 
Another incident occurred on 20 June 1 979 when Vietnamese 
troops killed 85 Vietnamese refugees whose boat had ventured 
into the is l and s whe:::-e Viet:nam had stat:ioned a garrison. I t 
was reported that military forces used heavy arms, including 
morcars, to carry ouc this actio!l .35 
In 1976 there were r e ports a!': Philippine mi litary aircraft 
being fired upon by che Vietnamese while flying near Song Tu 
Tay (Southwest Cay) . 36 
China has also a t ::cmpted to strengthen its presence i n the 
.::-egion, se!lding naval squadrons periodica l ly i nto the region. 
34 Alan J. Day, Op cit. p. 330 . 
35 Jon Van Dyke I< Dale Bennett , Op cit . p. 59 . 
36 .Ibid, p. 59. 
China made its first armed move into the Spratlys on March 14, 
1988, when in the guise of setting up a sea-level weather 
research station presumably sponsored by UNRSCO. the Chinese 
took control of six islands in the Spratlys. In t he process a 
brief naval engagemen t ensued where the Chinese sank three 
Vietnamese transport ships. k i lled 72 seamen and took nine 
prisoners. The Soviet Naval Ships which operated from Cam Ranh 
Say in Vie tnam stayed out in the conflict. Taking a neutral 
posture, Moscow advised Vietnam and China to resolve their 
dispute peacefully.37 
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, said after the 
i ncident: "What we have carried out in the Nansha islands is 
a scientific survey , entirely for peaceful purposes. The 
purpose is to monitor the sea, and thjs action is also 
designed to meet the proposal in a resolut i on passed by one of 
the organizations of the UN". That claim was however denied by 
UNESCO. Qian promised that "there will be no war in that area 
if Vietnam refrains from provocations against China and stops 
the seizure and occl'.pation of the islands, and wjthdraws all 
its troops from these islands and reefs". 38 Although there 
has not been any confrontation since then Vietnam has not 
withdrawn any of it s troops. However, this clash was a majoz: 
37 Far r.'astern Economic Review, Aug. 13, 1992, Op cit. p. 
15 . 
38 Jerry Cushing, "The Dragon's Long Reach", Far r.:astern 









factor i:1 tl:e d e teriorati::m of the re l a:..ionship between Ch i na 
and Vi etnam. Apparentl y both countr i es continue to fort i fy 
their presence in the i slands and reefs. 
In Apr i l n88, t he Malaysian Navy seized 49 Phi lippine 
fisheTmen who had alleged l y ente red Malays i an waters in the 
Spratly area near Comrr.odore Reef, which Malaysia had claimed 
to be within its :200-mile EEZ. The Philippines protes t ed 
vehemently, argu i ng that its fishermen were operating within 
Philippine waters when they were captured. Although the 
Malaysian governmenL fi,lally decided to release the Philippine 
f ': shermen, it decl ared that this act of generosity did not 
prejudice l'f.:alaysia's c l aim to the area. 39 This incident has 
further strained t he relationship of bo t h countries that have 
sometimes bitterly contested Sabah, a territory on the 
Northeastern part of the : s l and of Borneo and bordering 
Indonesian territory . Since l".:alays i a and t he Pl":ilippines have 
overlapping c l aims to their EEZ, more tension is like l y to 
emerge in the near futl:re. 
I f these sporadic armed confron :::ations continue and a::::-e 
not resolved, then a bigger securi t y prob l em rnay develop in 
Lhe region, simi l ar to wl:at l":appened in 1987. when Great 
Britain and Argen t ina went La war over the sovereignty of the 
Falkland Is l ands . For the moment China i s the mos ::: capable 
among the claimant countries La f l ex its muscle in the SOlltl: 
19 Ji Guoxi ng, Op cit:. p. 14. 
China Sea, it can call upon 45 major surface combatants, about: 
100 submarines, a naval task force that could operate at sea 
for at least 30 days and a naval infa!1cry brigade. 40 Nonethe-
less, should China cO!1tinue to aggressively undertake military 
action similar to what it did in forcibly evicting Vietnamese 
forces in the Paracels in 1974, there is a strong possibili ty 
of a=ed resiscance that will come fro~ the other claimant 
countries who have not only established garrison in their 
respective islands but have been gradual ly strengthening their 
military capabilities over the years. 
C. Overlapping Maritime Jurisdictional Zones 
Rival claims to mari,time zones generated by disputed 
possession of offshore islands are among the most frequent 
territorial disputes that require negotiation or arbitration. 
For centuries there have been disputes over the breadth of the 
extension of jurisdiction into the outer seas. 41 Though many 
countries accepted the three-nautical mile limit for terri t o· 
rial waters, the conference on the Law of the Sea held in 
Hague in 1930 by the League of Nations fai l ed to reach an 
agreement on the breadth of territorial seas. Prior to 1 945, 
there had been an acknowledged right or entitlement of a 
40 Susumu Awanohara, "South China Sea, washington's 
Priorities", Far Eastern Economic Review, August 13, 1992, 
P .18. 








































coastal state to exercise j urisdiction over the seabed areas 
cO:ltiguous to its coast. This may lie beyond iLs territorial 
sea limit. The modern contine!1tal shel f concept was brought 
about mainly by the need to accorrunodat e technological innova 
tions, anticipation of the existence of seabed resources, and 
the capac':xy to expl oit them. This concept originated from 
President Truman's proclamat ion on the Continental Shelf, 
issued in September 25, 1945. Its raLionale was based en the 
reasonableness and justice of according jurisdiction and 
control over the natural resources of the suhsoil and seabed 
of the continental shelf to the contiguous nation. 42 
The first United Nations Conference on t he Law of the Sea 
was held in 1958 in Geneva. Four conventions relating to the 
high seas, terri torial seas, fisheries and the :-:ontinental 
shelf were drafted. However, there were heat e d debates on tr.e 
t hree - nautical miles versus the 1 2 nautical miles li:nit~ at 
territorial seas , hence no agree merx was reached. The second 
1m Conference en the Law of the Sea, held in 1960 in Stockholm 
also failed because of disagre ements on the breadth of 
territoria:' sea as we l l as on t he territorial sea of islands. 
The third conference, held from 1973 to 1982 teak 20 session s 
and nearly a d e cade to adopt. Tn 1982, the UN Ccnve ntion on 
the [Jaw ot the Sea was finalized . The convention includes the 
42 Ibid, p. 19. 
33 
traditional form of complete jurisdiction and adds the notion 
of partial j u risdiction. n 
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention stipulates: 
• Every state has the right to estahlish the breadth of its 
territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 na'Jtical 
miles 
• In l?calities where the coas~line is deeply in~cnded and 
cut ~nto, the method of stra~ght baseline j oin~ng appro-
priate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from 
which the bread~h of the territorial sea is measured 
• The coastal state shal l not hamper the innocent passage ot 
foreign ships through the territorial sea 
• The coastal state may set up a cont:iguous zone not 
ext::ending beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines, and 
exerc is e in the zone the control necessary t:o prevent 
infringement of its customs, fiscal, im:lligration or 
sanitary regulations 
• A."l archipelagic stat:e may d raw straight haseline to define 
the breadth of its territorial sea, the contiguous zone, 
the e xclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental 
shelf 
• The sovereignty of an archipelagic state extends to the 
waters enclosed by the baseline, described as archipelagic 
waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the 
coast, and 
• The coastal state is entitled to have an exclusive 
economic zone not extending beyond 200 n.'ll from the 
baseline. 
The 1982 convention, despite its intention to minimize 
conf lict and eliminate ambiguity, is itself a source of new 
conflict . Under the convention a coastal state may lay claim 
a t least 200 nau t. ical miles of j urisdiction. Thus, this 
43 Kennet h R. Sim.."llonds , U.N. Convent ~on on the Taw of the 





















provision aggravateS the existi:1g situation -: :1 the Spratly 
I slands. In esse:1ce it is doubtful whether this :1ew detinition 
:..Jf cor. tincntal she l f or EEZ is fruitful to the SouLheast Asiar-
coastal states whose claims are always in conflict with the 
claims of other states. 'tiith the Spratlys and the Paracels 
tat.:cn as a base points, all coastal sLates of thc South China 
Sea will have national jurisdiction, with overlapping claims. 
The convention also grants to isla:1ds the right to have 
territorial waters, cont iguous zones, an exclusive e conomic 
zones and continental shelves in the sa>ne way as land territo-
ry . Though denying shelf and EEZ rights to rocics wh ich cannot 
sustain human ha!:;itation or economic life of thei r own, t his 
woul d defini t ely l ead to more conflicting situatio:1s in the 
Spratlys. The coastal states o f the South China Sea will face 
serious con f l ic ts of interest arising from t he ownership as 
well as the l egal status of the islands in dispute. If islands 
and rocks are measured separately, the Sout!1 China Sea would 
be studded with numerous patches of comp lete or partial 
Jurisdiction zones. I f the archipelago theory is ilpplied, 
large expar-ses of jurisdiction would 
that own the archipelagoes. 44 
under the states 
The South China Sca islands are very small and are 
scattered far apart. Based on the stipulatior:.s of the Law of 
the Sea Convention, it seems that they are not entitled 
44 Jon M. Van Dyice & Dale Bennett, Op cit, p. 21. 
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have an EEZ, but: cculd have a ccntinental shelf. 5'or the 
delimitation of the continental shelf of the Spr-atlys, one may 
take the i nhab:'ted i slands Bueh as Itu Aba Island, Spratly 
Island, 'I'h i tu I sland, Nansha IsLwd, Flat Island aod Swall clW 
Reef I sland as base paioes, draw straight lines connec t ing 
these base peints and thus define the 200 nautical m':'les or 








































IV . CURRENT THRUSTS TO RES OLVE THE CONFLICT 
A . Mi l itary Opt i o n s 
! I'. ilddition to the l egal initiatives undertaken by the 
various contendir:g countri es, military options seem to be 
preferred by China and Vietnam . China's military resolve has 
been heightened after its initial success in an armed confron -
tation with Vietnamese Forces in t he Paracel Islands in 1974 . 
Fol l ow i r.g the January 1974 c l ash, China cO:lsclidated its 
authority over the entire Parace l archipelago. As China 
consol idated its canLro l over the Paracels, VieLnam moved to 
secure its intercst in the Spra::. l y. The collapse ot the U. S .-
backed Saigon government in April 1975 encouraged Hanoi La 
seize con trol of six islands previously he l d by South Viecnam-
ese torce. 45 
Or::cc the Paracels were fir:nly in Chinese hands they se:r:ved 
as stepping 8Lones for a Chinese advance furt:her south to the 
Spratlys. The firs t Chil'.ese mi 1 itary incursion occarred on 8 
November 1980 when two t ype Hcng - 6 bombers patrclled the 
Spratly area. This was followed by repeated naval air recon -
naissance patrols in 1981 . This cul:ninat.ed in the biggest 
Chinese military power pro j ection that occurred in l"'.ay of that 
45 John w. GaJ:""V~r, "China ' s Push Through th~ Sou t h Cr. ina 
Sea; The InteracLion of 3ureaucratic ar::d NaLional Interest", 
The Chjna Oqart erly, December 1992 , pp. 1005 - 1006. 
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same year, when a navy troop carrier ferried 85 cornrnanders of 
naval vessels, professionals, and ohjet nav i.gators, 15 school 
and coJ lege instructors, 40 naval and f l eet ope rLltions and 
navigation cadres, 13 scientific research cadres and 235 
sai l ors surveying James Shoals, one of the cora l reefs of the 
Sprat l y is J ands group for 30 days.46 Since then mi l itary 
clashes have almost occurred on several occasions. According 
to a Chinese report, Vietnamese airplanes flew over Chinese-
held ::slands in the Spratlys, while Vietnamese warships 
monitored and harassed Chinese vessels j nvolved in survey and 
construction activities. 47 On another occasion, Vietnamese 
personnel disembarked from a ship to challenge a Chinese 
survey team on a reef, only to be warned away by a Chinese 
warship. Another incident occurred on 3~ J anuary ~988, when a 
Vietnamese navy freighter and an armed fishing vesse l l eft 
West Reef and approached Fiery Cross Reef loaded wi th con -
struction materials and more than 40 personnel. They were 
subsequently intercepted and turned back by Chinese warsh i ps. 
Another incident occurred on ~8 February ~988 when a Vietnam-
ese minesweeper and an armed freighter approached Cuateron 
Reef where a Chinese investigation team was working ashore, 
but the presence of Chinese warship again turned back the 
Ibid, p. ~C08 . 





















Viecnamese ~hips. 48 Diplomatic p:::.-otests were made by both 
CO'J.ntries, but it is worthwhile :::0 ooLe L"1at on 22 Febnla::::y 
the Chinese MinisLry of Foreign Affairs stated chat. . "Vietnal'l 
has no right to interfere with Chinese vesse l s patrolling 
their own t:erritorial wa:::ers. It is Vietoarr. that has occupied 
illegally is l ands <:Ind reefs in China's Nansha Is l ands. If the 
Vietnamese side i gnores :::he consistent: stand of the Chinese 
governrnent and hinders our legitimate accivities in t: hese 
it: will have :::0 bear t:he rcspor.sibility and the 
consequences" . 49 Thus, t hese repeated con£ror.t:aticns produced 
an armed clash on 14 March 1988 . Ter:sioo Llrcher increased 
when in the same month Vietnamese forces condu;cted a combined 
air-maritime exe::::cise simulating a battle with Chinese :orccs 
in the Spratlys . so 
Taiwan, hmlever, strongly indicated that she would be 
compelled to Sllpport t he Peeples Republ ic of Chir.a in the 
event that a mi l itary solution would be undertaken by China 
and Vietnam to resolve their differences over the Spratlys. 
This WQu l d fllrther aggravate the conf l ict, knowing fully wel l 
that Taiwar. had recently 9urch<lsed several u. S. F16 and :.1irage 
2000 figh c er aircraft and new Lafayette-c l ass frigates that 
48 Ibid, pp. 1012 -1013 . 
49 Ibid, p . 1013. 
50 Ibid. p. 1013. 
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are being constructed in France in pursuit of its military 
modernization program. 51 
The danger about tr.is kind of military solution is similar 
to the Falkland crisis in 1982, when diplomatic negotiatio!1s 
broke down and the claimant countries resorted to military 
action to set tIe their differences over the sovereignty of tr.e 
Falkland Islands. Should China and Vietnam insist on t:heir 
historical rights, which are strongly supported by their 
respective nationals, then both countries maybe dragged deeper 
into the brink of war. There maybe parallels here with the 
Falklands case. Lowell S. Gustafson who wrote The Sovereignty 
Dispu-:es over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, claims that 
Adolfo Silenzi de Stagni an Argentinean national called on the 
military j unta in 1981 to assurne the historic responsibility 
to occupy the Falkland islands before January 3, 1983. 52 
Negotiations to resolve tr.e territorial dispute over the 
Falkland I slands between E!1gland and Argentina began as early 
as 1965 through the United Nations Resolution 1514. In this 
resolution, England based her sovereignty claim on the 
principles of self-determina-:ion and limited acquisitive 
prescription, whi l e Argentina based her position on an 
irreconcilable historical claims. These resolutions were 
51 Julian Baum, "Taiwan Arms and Greased Palms", Edl;;: 
East ern Ecqnomic Review, March 3, 1994, pp 14-15. 
52 Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovere i gnty Disputes over the 






















doomed to :ai l tram the very star!". because no party wanted to 
corr.promise and some Argentinean hardl i:1ers favore d ;:;he llse of 
force in resolving ;:;he conflict. 53 Some Argentinean nationals 
like Costa Ylendez, on 9 May 1992, f l atly sta;:;ed that Arginti-
na's sovereignty over Lhe FaJ klandCl shoul d be the objec:tive of 
the negotia;:;ions. 54 Likewise the Communist Party of Argentina 
declared unequivocal sr.:pport for the restoration of nationa l 
sovereignty over the archipe l ago and insisted that Argentina 
shou l d under no circumsta:l.ces relinquish its sovereig:l. rights 
over the islands. 55 
On t he other har.d, the British pos ition as of 3 April was 
that the Falkland Islar:ds must "remain British" and be 
re t urned to Bri tish sovereignty. The Prime Minister at that 
time, Margaret Thatcher, who was dubbed the "iron lady", WdS 
wil l ing to rlsk the lives of Eri;:;ish servicemen in order to 
defend British sovereign terri tory, the British way of life, 
and the r i ght of the British people to determine the future of 
the Falkland I slands. 56 
Although Argen;:;ina was fighting a losing war against a 
:::.-elative l y superior foe, the Argentinean leaders be l ieved that 
"losing the war was not so important if jUClt fighting it 
Ibid, p. 
rbid , p . 121.. 
Ibid. p. 17.1.. 
Ibid. p. 121. 
ir:1proved the char::ces later for the r::egotiated solution" ,5 7 
Thus, the resu l t is now history where the lives of arour.d 
1, oeo your.g men were lost and the combatant nations lost 
billions of dollars, plus a loosening, to some degree, of tr,e 
t ies among western states, 
The MEAN states r:1ay learn some lessons from that experi -
ence, Even as China and Vietnam have cautiously avoided ar:y 
military action against the other claimants, this did not 
prevent t~em from modernizing their military capability nor 
improving the fortification of their garrisons in the Spratly 
islands, On the other hand, the aggressiveness of both 
conununist countries is giving mixed signals to the rest of the 
ASEk'l countries, South - East Asian countries want to keep Ch ina 
and Vietnam at arms' length hy cont rolling the South China Sea 
islands that are closest to their territory, They hope that 
PekiGg will become a friendly power and a trusted friend. 
Already Malaysia is acquiring 30 Soviet Mig 29s at a 
fairly reasonable price, has ordered two frigates from 
Britain , and signed a tentative agreer:1er.t with a Swedish 
shipyard for two submarines . These Mig 29s bought from Russia 
are considered t~e lates t version of the Fulcrum and include 
R-27 medium-range missiles and the R-73 short rar.ge infrared 
guided missiles which are widely viewed as the most sophisti -
cated I R-guided AAM currently in existence and a de c ade ahead 






















of current Side-winder :nissiles . 51'! Tl::is n:ili tary buildup by 
Malaysia is seen as a deterrence actior: dgainst any c.laimant 
countries a!l.d as a measu~e to enl::ance its security posture in 
the Suuth China Seas. 
On the other har:d, the Fhilippines , despite its economic 
problems and the sharp drop o f mi l itary aid that was previous -
ly provided by the U.S. prior to the pUll - out at its forces 
stat ioned at Subic Nava l Base and Clark Air Force Base, has 
embarked on a 10 , 15 year mi l itary modern':'zation program 
amounting to around iJ .S.$1.61 billion t o e!l.r.ance its n:i l itary 
capability and protect its inLerests in t.hese islands. This 
amou!l.tis supposed to replace the annt.:al U . S. military aid of 
U.S. $ 200 mi l lion provided up ~ntil 1991, representing about 
67% ot the l\rmed porces' acquisit i on and routi!l.e operating 
costs . This modernization program includes U',e purchase of 
t.h:::.-ee fast attack boats equipped with Exocet anti - ship 
miss iles fro:n Spain and Australia, to enhance naval capability 
and to respond to the percei ved Chinese threat . 5~ 
Only Vietnam for t he moment is not engaged in any signif i -
cant upgrading of its naval capabi l :i t ::e s , due Lo acute 
economic prob l ems. However, to compensate for its lack of 
frontline equipme,lt , Vietnam has been beet i ng u p i ts garrison 
58 J.N . Mak, "Malaysia's Mig Shock Asia", Pacific Defence 
Reporte:::.-, Aug-Sept. 1993, p. 9 . 
59 Ta i Mj n9 CheLing, 
Economic Review, August 13, 
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the Dragon" Far Eas t er!l. 
P. 19. 
on some of the islands in the Spratlys, including burying 
t anks into the ground, using them as gun emplacoo:moo:nts. 60 
I f a diplomatic solut.ion is not achioo:voo:d, the claimant 
countries will harrien their positions. War is bound to happen, 
just like the Falklands crisis in 1982. The sovereignty issue 
was a major stumb l ing block in the Falklands cris is and 
apparently China, Vietnam and Taiwan have employed historical 
precedents as the basis for their claims over the Spratly 
Islands. If ongoing diplomat".ic initiatives break down, as 
happened with t:he case of Great Britai:l and Argentina, then 
the inevi table will happen. 
B. Sharing of Maritime Boundaries 
These conflicts have all the ingredients of terri'.::oria l 
sovereignty, and overlapping maritime jurisdictions and 
interests, that requires t h e full cooperation of all parties 
concerned . The end of the cold war, coupled with the success -
ful resolution of the Cambodian conflict, have gradually 
brought about fundamental changes not only in the resolution 
of the conflict in the South China Sea but in the Asian-
Pacific region in general. 
One solution to this emerging crisis is the sharing of 
sovereignty over the Spratly Islands by all claimant coun-
tries, including clear delineation of their respective 




















maritime rights. This is what some of tl-,e c l <limants wa:!1t, but 
for the moment China will not accept the "haring of sovereign-
tv. Chi!la's recenL power projection in the South China Sea , 
coup l ed wi th t:1e proclamation :)f a new law cal led the Territo -
rial 'daters Act that was enforced in February 1992, clearly 
indicates that its ultimate aim is to assert its sovereign 
right ::lver these islands. In the long run China hopes to 
replace the United States and Russia in t he region . According 
to B.A. Hamzah, the Ass i stant Director - General of r-lalaysia's 
Institu te of Strategic and InternatLmal Studies, c l aims tha t 
what we are now witness i ng is a Pax Sinica in the mak i ng, in 
place of a re l UClant Pax Americana and impotent Russia. 61 
These initiat:ives at"e c;lcar-ly manifested by war-Kers in 
Shanghai shipy ar-ds who are hllSi l y putt:'ng t~e finishing 
to'.lches t o a :-JCW genct"ation Qf warships t:hat wi l l enhance the 
f i repower and lengthen ~he reach of the Chinese navy. 'Jp until 
the early 1980s, Chincse warships stayed c l ose to their home 
ports and opcrated mainly in China's nQrthern waters, coping 
defer-sively with the navi es of the Soviet Union and Taiwan. 
Bul the f ocus hegan shifting, wi t h the increasing possibility 
of discovering oil , as China laid claims t o almost al l of the 
islands in t:he SOl:th China Se a . 
One way to r eso l ve this conflic t is to adopt a mode l that 
wou l d avoid the u se of forc;e. Thc Timor Gap model could be 
61 E. A. Hamzah," chi na's Strategy", Far Easte::::-n Economi c 
Review, August 13 , 1 992 , p . 22. 
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presented for this particular case. 30th contending parties, 
!1aF.lely Indonesia and Australia, began exploring the pOSSibili-
ty of a provisional joint development regime to operate 
pending final delimitation of the seabed. The negotiations 
culminated on September 5, 1988 when the governments of both 
countries announced that an agreement had been reached in 
which the Timor Gap had been divided into three areas in a 
zone of cooperation (fig 3). The treaty created a Zone of 
Cooperation covering a surface area of about 60,500 square 
kilometers. This treaty sets out principles relating to the 
exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources as 
embodied in the following; 62 
• Annex A, which contains the designation and description of 
Areas A,B, and C of t he .z e ne of Cooperation, including 
maps and geographical coordination of tl'.e turning points. 
• Annex B, which sets out the Petroleum mining code. 
• Annex C, which is a Mode l Produc tion Sharing Contract, 
setting out the detailed arrangements for the exploration 
and exploitatior! of petroleum resources in t he area of the 
Zone; and 
• Annex D, which is a Taxation Code for the avoidance of 
double taxation with respect to activities in this joint 
area of exploration and exploitation of the petroleum 
resources. 
In order to ensure equality of opportunity in relation to 
employment for both Australians and Indonesians and so that 
62 Francis Auburn and vivian Forbes, The Timor Gap Treaty 
~he Law of the Sea Convention The University of Chicago 






















FIGURE 3 : Zone of Cooperatio 
Timol:' Gap Treaty and the Law n ~n the Timor Gap (Ref . The 
of t ne Sea Convention, p . 45) . 
one operator is not disadvantaged over another, provision is 
made for either: 
• A tripartite committee of Indonesian government, employer, 
and employees to provide conciliation and arbitration for 
Indonesian workers in Area A. 
• Australian workers in the Area to be represented by their 
unions. 
• The Industrial Relations Commission to provide concilia-
tion and arbitration for Australian workers; or 
• Preference to b e given to employing nationals or permanent 
residents of both countries . 
Indeed the Timor Gap Treaty, despite the objection of 
Portugal , has been in effect since 1991. As seen within the 
overall framework of Indonesian-Australian relations, it is a 
most detailed regime for sharing a joint development ventures 
for Continental Shelf petroleum resources. It may prove useful 
for purposes of resolving the Spratly Islands conflict. 
A constraint or weakness in this kind of agreement is that 
this is a bilateral agreement whereas in the case of the 
Spratly Islands their are six main players, hence they should 
be carefully considered. One of the e l ements is the settlement 
of the outstanding grievances hetween Vietnam and China, 
outside the core Spratly area - on land , in the gulf of Tonkin, 
and at sea in the Vanguard Bank area where China a warded a 
concession to crestone Oil of the United States. One way out 
would be for China and Taiwan to set aside their historic 





















~ombined share in a multi l ateral Spratly Devel opme:lt Authori ~ 
cy, which would i 1:. tu rn administer ar.d :nanage the exploration 
ar.d exploitation of resourc es i:1 this area. I f Vietnam 
r e ceives a favorable settlement in the Tonkin Gulf ar:d 
Vanguard Bank areas, it might cons i der sett l ing for a l esser 
share in the Spratly area . On the other hand, ::linec Brunei 
claims only a tiny porti.::m of the core area, its share should 
be smal:. The re:naining shares woul d be equitably allocated 
among Vietnam, the P:"1ilippines, Malaysia and Taiwan. Indeed, 
u:1c.er this s:"1aring regime the area coul d be demi litarized, 
sovereignty c l aims wou l d be frozen, and the Authori t y would 
resolve user conf: Jc ts, faci l itate e xploration and development 
of resources, manage f i sheri.es and maintai.n environmental 
quality . The legitimate transit of vesse:s wou l d likewise be 
allowed. Another role of the said Authority might be to 
promote In t ernationa ':' cooperation in scientific research and 
in protecting the vu lnerable ecosystems . 
C. Towards A Spirit Of Cooperation 
Twenty - one years ago ASEAN wishfully cal l ed for Southeast 
Asia to become a Zone of ?eace Freedom and Neutrali ty(ZOPFAN). 
During that bygone era in the region there was an intense 
superpower rivalry between the then Soviet union and the 
'Juited States, coupl ed with an adventurous Soviet - backed 
Vietnam, making the ZOPFAN concept more wishful thinking than 
reality. Today , the end o f the cold war has brought a tremen -
49 
dous change . Hence, during the annual ASEAN foreign ministers 
meeting from 21 - 26 July 1992 in the ?hi l ippines, attended Dy 
representatives from China and Vietnam the meeting focused to 
an unprecedented extent on security in the South China Sea, 
particular l y the Sprat] y Islands. ASEAN's brief statement on 
the South China Sea urged the settlement of all sovereignty 
and jurisdictional claims without resorting to (orce. It also 
called on all countries to cooperate to ensure the safety of 
maritime navigation and communication and to ensure other 
forms of envirOTL'Tlental and security cooperation . 63 
Apparently the move towards a common exploration and 
sharing ot resources, with the problem of sovereignty pushed 
aside fo r a certain period of time, is shaping up to be the 
consensus within the region. It is irrelevant who is presently 
occupying the islands. Joint venture enterprises should be 
established instead and agreements on inc ome distribution 
should be signed. In August 1990, Chinese Prime Minister Li 
Peng offered talks on the joint development of the disputed 
Spratly Islands. He said ... "China is ready to join efforts 
with the Southeast Asian countries to develop the islands 
while putting aside for the time being the question of 
sovereignty".64 
63 Rodney Tasker, "MEAN Facing up to Security" , Esu: 
~n Economic Reviqw, August 6, 1992, p. 8 . 
64 Sheldon W. Simon, The Regionalizat.iQ~~ 
S,Qutheast Asia, The National Bureau of As i an Research, 










This statement of Li Peng is opening a bright spot for 
peaceful negotiations, and with the growing improvements in 
management and technologica :' advancement offered by the 
leading oil companies, a move towards a peaceful solut ion 
would bring benefits ':0 all concerned. Over the years there 
has been a shift towards dramatic change i!'l the approach to 
effective management of ocean resources . Marine resources are 
interlinked and interdependent, part icularly resources l ying 
across the nationa l marine zones. The migratory and C.uid 
nature Qf marine reSO'-lrces, such as petroleum deposits or 
transboundary pollution and tuna transcend nati::mal boun~aries 
and raises unique management problems. Fish species exist i n 
an ocean environment maviEg through many exclusiv e economic 
zor,es (EEZj and are inevitably exploited by many nations. The 
character o[ petroleum deposits permit their removal [rom any 
direction without regOlrd to any fixe d boundary that may exist . 
The World Comrnission Report on Environment and Development has 
underscored this fact. "the shared resource characteristics 
of marine regi~mal seas w.akes forms of regional management 
mandatory . Hence the need for an effective uti l ization of the 
marine .:-eSO'.lrces depends on the development of cooperative and 
functional arrangements" . 65 
65 Joseph S. Wariota & Elizabeth Mrerna , Reg 10nal Coopera 
H OD : The Needs Of ~he 'louth, The University of Chicago Press, 
1 993, p. 97.. 
The conflict in the Spratlys, as i de from territ:oria l 
claims, has been sparked by the presen ce or poten tial o f 
hydrocarbon resources. I::: is essential to note that boundaries 
in the ocean that del i mit the functiona l jurisdiction of a 
coastal state ofte n do not coincide with t:he location of 
marine resources. 
In esse nce most ocean areas are interdependent in nature 
and cross many artificial boundaries. Since the 19808, the 
world has witnesse d a growing awareness of global inter-depen-
dence in economic, political, and environmental mat:ters and 
the need for a more hol istic approach to these i ssues. This 
awareness has led to the development of an approach to mari ne 
jurisdiction that emphasizes functional concerns. 
It may be noted that questions concerning sovereignty over 
islands or territory are excluded from maritime boundaries 
despite the sett l ements procedure under the : 982 LOS conven -
tion (Art 298 [1]) and therefore requires the express consent 
of the parties for an acceptable settlement procedure. 
Moreover, resolving issues concerning maritime boundaries has 
become time consuming. The contending par t ies must therefore 
endeavor to negotiate some provisional arrangements for 
reducing tension and promoting cooperation, to include a joint 
development zones. 
A model that could a l so be used in drafting a Spratly 
Treaty is the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. Antarctica, because of 






















tics, l ay unexp l ored dOC undeve : oped for several centuries. 
Antarctica covers d wide area of 11 million square ki l ometers, 
l'.inety-nine percent of its surface is covered by a thick ice 
sheet, wi t h an average depth of 2 ki l ome t ers, constitutir.g 
over 90 perc:ent of the world's ice. It ::'8 the coldes t conti -
neot. :t is also the hig:1.e8t with an average e levation of 2500 
me::ers, the dries t wit h an average precipita t ion of 1 0 ell'., and 
the windies t . However , expeditior:s and scientific activity 
peaked in the International Geophysical Year (IGY) in 1957 - 58 
when the twelve r.ations involved ir. L'1e P<.:ltarclic, Heven of 
which had made territorial claims (E'ig.4) , agreed that these 
political and l egal differences shoul d be set as::de in the 
int erest of carrying out scientific research ir. close and 
peaceful cooperation. This mode l calls for the setting up of 
a cooperatio~ ::::egirr.e under which claims would be frozen, a!'ld 
a Spratly Authori ty established to eliminate conflict and 
facilitate the management of the development of oi l , maritime 
resources, as we l l as the maintenance of environme!'ltal 
quality. Tr.e Anta rctica Treaty froze t er::::itorial c:aims, 
suspending L"1em '.mtil the pact became subj ect to ::::eview in 
1991. The Trea t y was signed in 1 959 by the twelve nations 
wh i ch had maintained statior:s there dur i ng the IGY namely 
Argentina, Austra l ia , Eelgium, Chile, F::::ance, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the U!'lited 
States, and tr.e USSR. Sixteen natior.s have j eined sir.ce it 
came int.o ferce i n 1-961 namely Bulgaria, Brazil, China, 
53 
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Czechoslovaki a, Denmark, the Federal Republic ot Germany, the 
German Democratic Republic, India, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Po l and, Romania, Spa i n, and Uruguay. 
This treaty exp l icitly aims to further the p'.1rposes ann 
principles of the Uni t ed ~ati::ms Charter . Among its important 
features are t.he follc!'I.'ing: 66 
• Stipulates that Antarctica should forever be used exclu -
sively for peaceful purposes and not become the scene or 
object of internationa l discord. 
• Prohibits nuclear explosLms and the disposal at' nuclear 
waste, and measures "of mi l itary nature" 
• Guarantees freedom of scientific research throughout 
Antarc tica, and promote the exchange at in~onna::ion on 
sci entific programs, of scientific observa::.ions and 
results, and of scient~ific personnel. 
• Estab l ishes a comprehensive sys,:::em of on-sit e inspection 
hy observers to promote t :'1e objectives and ensure the 
observance of the Treaty; and 
• Removes the potential for sovereignty disputes between the 
Treaty parties. This safeguard is contained in Article IV, 
which ensures that the legal position with respect to 
sovereignty of the Treaty parties is not prejudiced by any 
acts ur activities taking place during the lifetime of the 
Treaty. NO New claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, 
may be asser::ed while the Treaty is in fo!:"ce (Annex E) . 
There are differences between the Antarctic and the 
Spratlys. A:ltarctica is remcte, unmilitarized, uninr,abited and 
costly to develop. I n contrast the Spratly Islands are newly 
d::scovered, surruunded and militarily occupied by all claimant 
c::)Untries, strategical l y important and has potential l y vast 
66 The AP"arct 1 c Treaty, Ca!1herra l'ublishing and Pr.inting 
Co ., 1983, pp. 4-6. 
wealth. However it is worthwhile to note that the Antarctica 
Treaty removes the basic obstacle of resolving the territorial 
disputes and above all prohibits the use of these lands for 
the establishment: of military bases or fortifications as wel l 
as the testing of any type of military weapons or the use of 
these lands for nuclear explosions. These provisions are good 
references with regard to the settlement of the Spratly issue. 
AS regards to the formulation of a Sprat:ly Treaty the contest-
ing countries shQ1.~ld explore the possibility of soliciting the 
assistance and cooperation of regional as well as internation· 
a1 organizations to help in the formulation of such a treaty, 
as well as the creation of an appropriate infrastructure for 
the Spratlys. Although there are some limitations of these 
international and regional organizations, they could initial l y 
provide the needed structure and mechanisms that woul d hel p 
reduce the lingering tensions over the Spratly Islands. These 
includes among others, the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), Tanzanian Commission for 
Science and Technology (TCST), Indo- Pacific Fishery Commission 
(IPFC), the Indian Ocean Fishery Conunission (lOFC) , and the 
Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation Progra:rme l IOMAC) .67 
Within the region there are existing organizations such as 
ASEAl .... , Pacific Econo:nic Cooperation Conference [PECC), and 
67 S. P. Jagota, MariTime Em!ndary and Joint Development'. 
~: Emerging Trends, The University of Chicago Press, 1993. 





















As i a Pacific Econcmj c Coope:::a t ion (APEC) forum . Morecver. L'le 
exist i ng b i late ral agreements among ccntesti!1g count:::ies to 
j ointly develop marine !:"esources in the i r common boundaries 
such <:IS the f. i shery agreemer:. t adopted by Ma l aysia and the 
Phi l ippines, and the j oint fishing rights arrangements between 
the P:lilippines and Taiwan, are steps t oward coopera t ive 
arrangement. 6ll 
D. United States Role As A Mediator 
Onl y in recent years have development prospects for oil 
and hydrocarbons in t:le ~O'-lth C:'lina Sea beccme bright, drawing 
many fo:::e i gn i nvestors. I!o· ... ever, they are hampered by the 
brewing conflict in the Spratly Islands and their common 
desire is for a fina l r e solution cf the conf l ict before 
embarkir.g on a full time development of the oil potent i al 
underneath t ;'l i s ocean floor. The Ylobil Oil Corporation 
pioneere d a commercial oi l dri l ling operatic!'. off t he coaSL of 
Vietnam at the height of the Vietr,am war, b ut was :orced LO 
vacate in faver of a joint Vie t namese-Russian venture follow-
lng t he communist Vietnames e victory in 1975. Thereafte!:" the 
United States imposed a trade embargo, thus shiftir,g the 
in t erests of the U.S. oil companies to undertake j oint 
VC!1tures wit h Cbina and th e Phi l ippines . Vietnam, on the other 
hand, signed eleven production sharing contra~ts in 1988 to 
6ll Mark J . Va lencia,"A Sprat l y Solution", 
Economic Review, March 31, 1 994, p. 30. 
EastF'];,O 
develop oil along its territorial boundaries. These companies 
include Royal Dutch/Shell, a giant Catch-British joint 
venture; Total; Broken Hill Proprietary (SH;?) ; British 
Petroleum (3P); Enterprise Oil of Britain ; The Oil and Natural 
Gas Comrr.iss ion of India; Petro Canada; Petrofina of Belgium; 
Pc t ronas, a Ma l aysian state - owr,ed o il company; SCEPTER 
Resources of Canada; and a consortium led by SECAB of Sweder. 
and International Petroleum Ltd. of Canada. (Fig . 5) .69 Not 
to be outdone , ar.d to r e move the barrier for the American 
companies, these firms strongl y lobbie d for the lifting of the 
U.S. trade embargo that was finally approved on February 3, 
1991\. Ea.::-lier, in June of 1992, a leading u.s . oil company, 
the Crestone Energy Corporation of Denver, Colorado, started 
laying the ground work for a j oir. t development appyoach 
between China and Vietnam over the areas where they have a 
common boundary. These arrangements may signal the start of a 
cooperative regime that is hampering the development of oil by 
other claimant countries. The other claimant countries have a 
great dea l at stake in the potential l y hydrocarbon rich Soath 
China Sea. At present Malaysia, the earliest oil operator in 
the sea among the claimant countries, is producing oil from 
ninety oil wells and plans to sper.d $210 millior, for South 
China Sea development over the next three years. Brunei 
operates nine oi l fields ir. the South China Sea, whe::-e it 
69 Murray Hiebert, "Second Time Lucky?", Far Eastern 









FIGURE 5: Foreign Oil Exploration off the Coast of Vietnam 
( ~.Hieber t, PEER 5/ 7 /92 P . 6 5 ) . 
59 
produces 143,000 harrels per day and is targeting a jump in 
production. Although the Philippines produced a modest amount 
of oil in :991 in its oil field off ~orthwes:: Palawan, Alcorn 
I nternationa l and Royal Dutch/Shell Group plan to increase 
drilling wells within the Philippines 26,000 square kIn sec to!" 
of the South China Sea. 70 
While the claiman t countries are strengthening their 
claims over the Spratlys, there seems to be a common concern 
for resolving this crisis through peaceful means, even to the 
extent DE seeking the assistance of the United States as a 
nediator. In fact these sentiments were strongly echoed by 
memr.ers of the ASEAN ministerial conference on 21-26 July 1992 
in Manila, regarding the territorial disputes over the Spratly 
Islands. "For the first time all six members openly called on 
the United States to maintain a comforting military balance in 
the region".ll The U.S. presence traditionally served to 
balance not just the Soviet threat but the overall security 
posture in the region, which includes a nuclear China, a Japan 
with unrivaled economic and growing military potential, and a 
volatile North Korea . 
In response to this call, U.S. President Bi l l Clinton has 
clearly articulated the American role in the region during the 
surrunit :"or the fifteen members of the Asia-Pacific in Seattle, 
70 Oil & Gas Tq\lrnal, July 13, 1992 Op cit. p. 21. 
Far Eastern Economic Review, August 6, 1992, Op cit. 























DE'cerrber 1993 when he stated . .. " I :nagine iEl A.sian - Pacific 
reg i on in whict robust: dnd open econo:nlc competition is a 
sou!:"ce of jobs and opportunity wit hout becoming a source of 
host ili ty and instabillty,,72 It is thus very clear where the 
UulLed Stat es stands on the i ssue of cor:flic t in the Spratly 
I slands and the South China Sea . The United States position on 
the Spratlys and the South China Sea is one of neutrality in 
the territorial disputes. Washington is not makir:g any judge-
ments on the merits of t he cla i ms by any ot the conLesting 
CQ1Eltries over t:'1e Spratlys and has no l egal p8sition; it is 
for preserving the freedom of navigation ; i t supports a 
peaceful resolution and 8pposes any country dominating o:!:" 
enforcing iLs c l aim mi l itarily. 73 Enga9ing in eco:'J.Omic compe-
titio!"! wou ld be in the inte!:"ests of everyone, especial l y when 
these areas could provide ar. alternative source of oil fa!" all 
countries of the world. 
Indeed there are varying inte:!:."ests of the United States in 
Asia, eit~er founded or, historica l p:!:"ccerients or on l or.gsta!1d· 
ing aJ 1 iances developed during t he col d war e:!:"a. As noted by 
Edward A. Olsen and Richa!:"d J. El linqs . . " I t wil l be :lecessary 
for Arne:!:."icans to pay attention to Asia, but increasingly on a 
72 Gordon Crovitz, "The Pacific Ce ntury, its Beginning 
Ahead as Scheduled", Far Eastern Economic Revie'.oI , December 38, 
1.993 & Ja n 6, 1.994, p . 32 . 
73 John F . Morton, "U.S. Optimis t ic That Sprat l y Is l ands 





selective basis or. their own terms to the degree possible. 
p..rncricans need to be in the driver's seat of their country's I 
dest.iny, ~ess dependent upon :-.he vagaries of partners and 
freer of unwanted risk, eost and liabilit.ies. Like champion 
athletes in an endurance race, great powers need to choose 
wisely when t.hey draft their compe:::itors and wheYl they lead-
when they let others assume primary respons:"bility and cost 
and when they assume these themselves". '14 This pragmatic 
peaceful suggestion brings to mind the major role ot American 
leadership in reso::'ving lingering territorial disputes such as 
the Spitzbergen Is::'and conflict contested bet.ween Norway and 
Russia. The Ur.ited States ::'ed in the formulation of the 
Spitzbergen Treaty, of 1.920 because of the interests of an 
Americar. mi'Cling company, Ayer and Longyear which were mir.ing 
coa::' in conunercia::' quaYltitieB since the 1.920B and because of 
its stra:::egic importance of guarding against tr.e Soviet 
buildup in tr.e Mllrmansk-Kola peninsu::'a area during the cc::'d 
war period. Spitzbergen f01::11\s an archipelago consisting of 
several ::'arge and small is~ar.ds tr.at lies 400 nautical miles 
off the Norwegian mainland (Fig 6). Just like the disputes 
over tr.e Spratlys, the c~aimant countries involved in the 
Spitzbergen area ':'nvoked historical, scientific and economic 
interests, ir. addition to geograpr.ical proximity. The treaty 
74 Edward A. Clser. Richard J. ElliYlgs, Asia's Challenge 
to American "-eend tv, National 3ureau of Asian Research, 
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that was :8rmulated was t~he result of the interaction cf 
private cconom::c interests and L'le full endorsement of the I 
u. s. congress and the State Dcpartrr.ent. In essence, this 
treaty clearly recogn::zed t:"1e full sovereignty of the ':slands 
as Norwegian, but it also guaranteed t~he r':ghts of the Cn':ted 
States and other signatories to have access to L"1e islands, 
including the equal enjoyment of fishing and hunting rights on 
the island in the territorial waters, and also their equality 
in maritime, industrial m':n':ng, and commercial act~ivit=-es. 75 
':'his treat~y :1.a8 resolved the conflict and the ::'slands cont':nue 
to be demilitarized while Norwegians and Russians continue to 
jo':ntly mine coal to serve t:1.e':r respective economic inte~ests 
as well. 
The Unitec. States, as a leading world power, could help 
a::::hieve a similar resolution of the Sprat.ly conflict hy 
peaceful means, especially wiL1. ::'ts economic interests in the 
region and the presence of several U. S. 0':1 companies des':r':ng 
to partic':par:e in develop':ng 0':1 in the South C:1.ina Sea drea. 
75 Elen C. Singh, The SD'tzbergen (Svalbard) Question: 
~ted St.ates Foreign pol icy, Cniver sitets::orlaget, Oslo, 






















There has been a gradual increase of t:he military Dui ldup 
the Sp--:atly I slands since the mid-1970s by claimant 
cO·.lntries, composed of China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
Brunei and the Philippines. Apparently, each cont.esting 
country is contimlOusly solidifying its respective claims in 
view of its interes ts rang ing from t he prospect of oil 
discoveries and ':he emerging trend toward more maritime space 
by virtue of the 2:10 miles exch.lsive economic zone concept. 
There have been spo-::'adic military confrontations among 
c l aimant countries over r;he Sprat l ys bu t the most serious 
military battle was the one fought between China a !1d Vietnam 
i:1 Mar-en 198e . Except Ear Brunei, the other claimant co:mtries 
have cont inued to beef up tbeir garrisons in their respecr:ive 
is l ands in the Spratlys. However, the e:1d of the cold wa r has 
brought about a dramatic change and countries in the region 
have sought peaceful solutions. Similarl y, t he United States , 
despite the pullout of its mili tary contingent in the P;'1ilip -
pines, supports a peaceful resolution o[ L'1e disputes and 
wants to preserve freedom of navigation in these vital 
line of communications in the South China Sea. 
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A. BURY THE HATCHET 
Its about time that these contending countries sett-:e 
t:'leir longstanding animosities and historical c:aims or "bury 
L'le hatchet", so to speak, and move toward a pragmatic.: 
development approach in resolving this brewing confl iet in the 
Spratly Islands. Cooperation ar.d not military action S~1.0uld be 
pursued to benefit everyone and to ir.sure the continued 
stabi:ity that is t.he precondition for developmental growth in 
the South China Seas. It is essential that confidence building 
be pursued by all claimant countries otherwise the inevitab:e 
will happen, just as earlier explained with regard to the 
~alkand War in 1982. Moreover, the events of World War II are 
still very vivid in the memory of all Asian cour.tries wher. 
Capan not or.ly forced its will upon Asian countries in L'le 
pursuit of its East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere policy but also 
projected its military power as :ar as Hawaii to challenge a 
powerful state such as the United States, thus causing the 
outbreak of L'le ?acitic War. It is, theretore, high time t-hat 
all parties declare the Spratlys a demilitarized, nuclear 
weapons· free zone. 
Ir. the same vein the Asian countries are very wary of the 
mixed signals shown by China towards its claims, not on~y over 
the Spratly Island group, but their historical claim over all 
islar.ds in the South China Seas. China wants to resolve the 
Spratly issue peacefully, but at t2l.e same time asserts her 








































only contesting country that possessefl weapons of mass 
destruction and indications show L"1at it is grad:.lally trans -
fanning itself to be a hegemonic power in Asia. China ' s 
massive military bui l dup, maneuvers on land and in t he South 
China Sea, and its shift towards a blue water navy, are 
sending shock waves to the other contefl t ing countries . «or the 
momen t no combined Southeast Asian coun Lries could equal the 
military power of China today a:1d tr.is is what worries not 
only the contesting countries belt a l l the other nations in the 
region as well. The apparent buildup of military capabili t ies 
in t he region does not augur well, but wil l only strain 
relationships, discourages the f low of much needed foreign 
inves t ment , a:1d furthe r crea t e O:luspicions that may eventua l ly 
jeopardize the economic gains so far attai:1ed in this region . 
It is high t i me t hat this brewing tensio!l in the Spratlys 
should be resolved so t hat tr.e e n ormous quantity of oi l 
reserves may be full y developed to hel p provide economic wel l 
J:.;eing among the contesting countries. Furthermore, the who l e 
worl d in genera l woul d benefit once a commercia l qua:1tity of 
oil is al l owed to flow uninterrupted from these offshore 
fie l ds . 
MARCH TOWARDS A COOPERATIVE REGIME 
The call of' t he ASEAN cou:1ties for a peacefu l so l ution 
shau l d be pursued more rele:1tless l y in future ministe r ia l 
conferences. Perhaps a coopera t: ive spirit should now prevail 
over their own national interests. They cannot forever depend 
on th8 security guarantee provided by the United States 
because it to o is constrained by its own security and economic 
interests in the reg ion . As John J. Arquilla noted in his 
article, "Constraints on Regional Deterrence After the Co l d 
War" when he said that "clearly, the greatest constraint 
imposed by economic factors l ies in the likelihood that 
American deterrent efforts will be vitiated by ar. inability to 
maintain favorabl e local :calances of forces " . 76 Trnly, there 
is a gradual decrease of U . S. military contingent in Asia with 
the pullout of the U.S. fo::::-ces from Clark Air Base and the 
Subic :>l"aval base in the Philippines in Decer:Jber 1992. Contend-
ing countries should now consider this reality and aspire to 
develop a solution among themselves. Wi thout any cooperative 
agreements, the s t ates of the region wil l continue to occupy 
the offshore is l ands with a view towards substantiating their 
territorial claims and enforcing their economic zone claims. 
The end of the cold war and the diminishing influence of 
the United State s and Russia in this region is ope ning a 
window of opportunity for these contesting coun t r i e s to chart 
the ir own cooperative a nd security endeavor . The strat.egic 
significance of these islands which lies along busy sea l ine 
of conununication in the South China Seas should propel these 
claimant countries to have a conunon cooperative endeavor . The 
76 John J. Arquilla, Constraint gn Regignal De t e rrcncg; 






















Spratlys location in the heart ot the Sou:::h China Sea is also 
strategic fer bases for sea - lane defense, interdiction, 
surveil l ance ot surface vessels and submarines , and possibly 
as jumping ott board for attacki:J.g other countries in As i a. I t 
is high time that an agreement or treaty shou l d be :Carmu l ated 
either fol l owing the Timer Gap or the Antarctica mede l that 
calls fer a cooperative regime in developing the vast marl ne 
and oil potentials underneath the ocean floor. 
China. Vietnam and the Philippines, since 19809 r.ave 
recognized that advanced technology and expertise, coupled 
'illth solid capita l , are essent i a l j n this kind of ventur.e, 
where the costs ot product i on and operation are high . Along 
this l ine a Spratly Cooperative Authority patterned after the 
Timor Gap Agr.ee:nent coul d be set up tc manage the total 
develcpment cf all rescurces of the Sprat l y :slands. The 
authority should not only manage the expl orat i on of o il and 
mari.ne r.esources , but should promo:::e cooperation in scientific 
researcr. as well as the protection of the V"J.lnerable ecosys-
tem. Moreover, to offset the relative ly low and stable price 
of oil in the world market requ i res modern teChnolog i cal know 
how and the guarantee of capital and expertise from world 
renowned oi l producing companies. Thus, existing bi l ateral, 
reg j onal , and mu l tilateral organizations could help provide 
some structure or mecha!lisms for the formulaticn of coopera -
ti.ve arrangements that would be De!leficia l to al l parti.es 
concerned. Unless these nations move quickly and come to 
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terms, they may find that they have lost not just a sol ution 
to this lingering problem in the Spratlys but a chance to take 
an important step towards economic and security arrangements 
that would, in the long run, guarantee peace and development 
of the region well into the next century. 
?he march toward a cooperative regime is therefore 
inevi table if these contending countries namely China, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Tai wan, Brunei and the Philippines wish to 
reap the potential underneath the ocean floor of the Spratly 
Is lands. A cooperative regime would open the waters and 
seabeds around the islands to commercial development and could 
yield :lew oil and gas fields as well as develop fishery 
resources that could benefit all these contending countries. 
The resources on land and the offshore oil reserves 
gradually diminishing and a promising alternative is the 
untapped marine and oil potential that will help t. hese 
contending countries keep pace with the evolving economic as 
well as the emerging world order in the next. century. These 
potentials are so great that the contending countries should 
reconcile their differences through the recommended coopera-
tive regimes as quickly as possible so that they will not miss 




























ANNEX A; THE ASEAN DECLARATION ( BANGKOK DECLARATION ) 
This Declaration gave birth to the Association of South -
east Asian Nations (ASEAN). There were five origi nal, or 
founding. member States: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
S ingapore and Thailand. Brunei became i n dependent on 1 January 
1 984, and joined ABEAN on 7 January of that year. 
The aims and purposes of ABEAN are, inter a L ia, 
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and 
cuI tural development in the region •.• I 
2. To promote regional peace and stability .. _, 
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance 
on matters of common interest in t he e c onomic, social, 
cultural technical scientific and administrative fields; 
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of 
training and research facilities in the educ ational, profes -
sional, technical and administrative sphere; 
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater 
utilization of trade, agriculture and industry; 
6. To promote Southeast Asian studies; 
7 . To maintain close and beneficial c o-operation with 
exi sting international and regional organizations with similar 
aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer co-
operation among themselves. 
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The Antarct ic treaty 
Article I 
1 . Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only: ~here 
~~~~~e ~e s~~~hiabsit~~~ ~~~~l~!:';~ntan~f me:islutt~Sr/f bar:~~l t:~~ 
fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuver, as 
'Nell as the testing of any type of weapons . 
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military 
personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any 
other peaceful purposes. 
Article II 
Freedom of scientific invest iga tion in Antarctica and 
cooperat ion tO'Nard that end, as applied during the Interna -
tional Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the 
provisions of the Treaty . 
Article II I 
1. In order to promote international cooperat ion in scientific 
investigation in Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of 
the present Treaty , the Contracting Parties agree t ha t , to the 
greatest extent feasible and practicable: 
a . information regarding plans for specific programs in 
Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy and 
efficiency of operations; 
b. scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica 
between expeditions and stations; 
c . Scientific observations and results from Antarctica 
shall be exchanged and made freely available. 
2. I n implementing this article, every encouragement shall be 
given to the establishment of cooperative working relatior.s 
with those Specialized Agencies of the United Nations and 
other international organizations having a scientific or 
technical interest in Antarctica. 
Article IV 
Nothing contained in the present Treaty sr.all be interpret · 
ed as, 
a. a renur.ciation by any Contracting Party of previously 
asserted rights or claims to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica; 
b . a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party 





















wr,ich it may have whether as a result of ~::s activities of 
those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; 
c. pre j udicing the position of any Contracting Party as 
regards its recognition of any other State's right of or 
claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarc-
tica. 
~. !!o acts or activities taking pl,:,"ce while the present Treaty 
lS In ~orcc shall constitute a basJ-s for asserting, supporting 
or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or 
create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, 
or- enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereign -
~y in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is 
J-ll torce. 
Article V 
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there 
of radioactive waste material shall be prohibited. 
2. In the event of the conclusion of international agreements 
the usc of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and 
the disoosal of radioactive waste material, to which all of 
the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to 
participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX arc 
parties , the rules established under such agreements shall 
apply in Antarctica. 
Article VI 
The provisions of the present Treaty Shall apply to the area 
south of 60 degree South Latitude, including all ice shelves, 
but nothing in ':he present Treaty shall prejudice or in a:lY 
'liay affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any 
State under international law with regard to the high seas 
within that area . 
Article VII 
1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the obser-
va:lce of the orovisions of the present Treaty, each Contract-
ing Party w~ose representatives are entitled t8 participate in 
the meetings referred to in Article IX of the Treaty shall 
have the right to designate observers to carry out any 
inspection provided for by the present Article. Observers 
shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties which designate 
them. The names Of observers shall be communicated to every 
other Contracting Party having the right to designate observ -
ers, and like notice shall be given of the termination Of 
their appointment. 
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2. Each obse~er designated ir. accordance with the provisions 
of oaragraph 1 of this article shall have complete freedom of 
access at any time or any all areas of Antarctica. 
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installa -
tions and equipment wi thin those areas, and all ships and 
aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes and 
personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all time to ~nspec ­
tion by any observers designated in accordance with paragraph 
1 of this Article. 
4. Aerial obse~ations may be carried out at any time over any 
or all areas of Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties 
having the right to designate observers. 
5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time whe n the present 
Treaty enters into force for it, inform the other Contracting 
Parties, and thereafter shall give them notice in advance of; 
a. all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part 
of i ts ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica 
organized in or proceeding from its territory; 
b. all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; 
and 
c. any military personnel or equipment intended to be 
introduced by it into Antarctica subject to the conditions 
prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article! of the present Treaty. 
Article VIII 
1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions 
under the present Treaty, and without prejudice to the 
respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to 
the jurisdiction over all persons in the Antarctica, observers 
designated under subparagraph 1 {b) of Article III of the 
Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such 
persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the 
Contractit!g Party of which they are nationals in respect of 
all acts or omissions occurring while they are in Antarctica 
for the purpose of exercising their functions. 
2 . Without prejudice to the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this 
Article, and pending the adoption of measures in pursuance of 
subparagraph 1 {e) of Article IX , the Contracting Parties 
concerned in any case of dispute wi th regard to the exercise 
of jurisdiction of Antarctica shall inunediately consult 
together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable 
solution. 
Article IX 





















preamble to the present: Treaty shall :neet at the City of 
C~nberra · ... ithin two months after the date of entry into force 
ot the Treaty, and thereafter at su~table lntervals and 
places, for the purpose of exc,hanging inforn;ation, consulting 
together on mat':ers of common lnterest gertalning to Antarcti" 
ca, and formulating and considering, and recommending to their 
Governments, measures in the furtherance of tho principles and 
ObJectives of the treaty, includlng measures regarding ; 
a. use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; 
h. facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica; 
c. Facilitation of international scientific cooperation in 
Antarctica; 
d. facili~ation ot the exercise of the rights of inspec -
:::ion provide 1n Article VII of the Trea:::y; 
e. questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in 
Antarctica; 
f . preservation and conse:!:'vation of living resources in 
Antarc::ica. 
2. Each Contrac::ing Party which has become a party to the 
p~esent Treaty by accession under Article XII I shall be 
enti::led ::0 appoint representatives to pa~ticipation the 
meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of :::he present A~ticle, 
during such time as tha:: Contracting Party demonstra:::es its 
interest in Antarctica by conduccing substancial scientific 
research activity there, such as the establishment of a 
scientific station or the despatch of a scientific expedition. 
3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article VIr of 
the present Treaty shall be transmitted to the representatives 
of the Contracting Pdrties participating in the meetings 
referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article . 
4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article 
shall become effective when approved by all the Contracting 
Parties wh8se representdt::'ves were entitled to participate in 
the meetings held to consider those measures. 
5. Any or all of the rights established in the present Treaty 
may be exercised as from the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty whether or not any measures faci l itating the exercise 
of such rights have been proposed, considered or approved as 
provided in this Article. 
A:!:'ticle X 
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropri-
ate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in 
Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the 
present Trea ty. 
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Article XI 
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the , Contract-_ 
i ng Parties concerning the interpretatlcn or appllcaticn ot 
the present Treaty, thos;: Contrac~ing Part~es shall consult 
among themselv:es w1th a V1ew t ,o hav1ng ~h~ d1spute resolved by 
negotiation, 1nquiry, mediat10n, conc111ation, arbitrat10n, 
j udicial settlement or other peaceful means of the1r own 
choice. 
2. A1:1y d i spute of this character not so resolved shall, with 
the consent, in each case , of all part ies to the dispute, be 
referred to the International Court of Justice for settlement; 
but failure to reach agreement on reterence to the Interna-
tional Court shall not absolve parties to the dispute from the 
responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any ot 
the various peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
Article . 
Article XII 
1a. The present Trea ty may be modified or amended at any time 
by unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX. Any such modification of 
amendment shall enter into force when the depository Govern -
ment has received notice from all such Contracting Parties 
that they have ratified it. 
b. Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into 
force as to any other Contracting party when notice of 
ratification by it has been received by the depository 
Government. Any such Contracting Party from which no notice of 
ratification is received within a period of two years from the 
date of entry into force of the modification or amendment in 
accordance with the provisions of subparagraph 1 (a) of this 
Article shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the present 
Treaty on the date of the expiration of such 
period. 
2 a. If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of 
entry into force of the present Treaty, any of the Contracting 
Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in 
the meetings provided for under Ar::icle IX so request by 
communication addressed to the depository Government, a 
Conference of a ll the Contracting Parties shall be held as 
soon as practicable to review the opera::icn of the Treaty . 
~ . AIly modif ication or amendment to the present Treaty which 
1S approved at such a Conference by a majority of the Con -
tracting Parties there represented, including a majority of 
those whose representatives are entitled to participate in the 





















by the depository Government to al l the Com:racting Parties 
inurtcd~ately after the termination of the Conference and sha l l 
enter into force in accordance with the provisions of para-
graph 1 of the present Artic l e. 
c. If any such modification or amendment has not entered i nto 
force in acc;ordance with the provisions of subparagraph 1 (a) 
of the Artic l e within a period of two years after :;he date of 
its communication to all the Contracting Parties, any Con-
tracting Party may at any time after the expiration of that 
period give notice to the depository Government of its 
wi thdrawal from the present Treaty; and such wi thdrawa:' shall 
take effect two years after the receipt of the notice by the 
depository Government. 
Article XIII 
1. The present treaty shall be sub j ec,: to ratification by t he 
signatory States. It shall be open for accession by any State 
wh ich is a :.1ember of the United l'fations, or by any other State 
which may be invi-ced to accede to the Treaty with the consen t 
of all the Contracting Parties whose represen':atives arc 
entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under 
Article IX of the Treaty. 
2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shal l be 
effected by each State in accordance with i':s constitutional 
processes. 
3 . Inst ruments of ratification and instr'clments of accession 
shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of 
America, hereby designated as Ule depository Government. 
4. The depository Government shall inform all signatory and 
acceding States of the date of each deposit of an instrur:1e nt 
of ratification or accession, and the date of entry in':o force 
of the Treaty and of any modification or amendment thereto. 
5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by al l the 
signatory Sta':es, the present Treaty shall e nter into force 
for those States and for Sta':es wh ich have deposit ed instru-
ments of accession. Thereafter the Treaty shall enter in to 
force for any acceding State upon the deposit of its instru-
ment of accession . 
6. The present Treaty shall be reg istered by the depository 
Government pursuant to the Article 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
Article XIV 
The present Treaty, done in the English, French, Russian, and 
77 
Spanish languages, each version being equally authentic, shall 
be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United 
Sta::.es of America, which shall transmit duly cer::.ified copies 
thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding 
States . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipctentiaries , duly 
authorized, have s igned t he present Treaty . 
DONE at washir.gton this first day of December one thousand 
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